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It is vital for the global economy that the G20 is as effective as 
possible. The forum has achieved much but faces many challenges. To 
improve its effectiveness, G20 members have to be clearer about their 
shared objectives given that it is a large and heterogeneous grouping. It 
must better explain to the public how all its activities are directed 
towards achieving these objectives, because they often involve difficult 
domestic decisions. To strengthen its legitimacy, it must be more 
transparent with its operations and how members are accountable for 
their commitments. 
To strengthen these key elements, the Framework for Strong, 
Sustainable and Balanced Growth should be the core of the G20. It 
should be the basis for clarifying members’ shared objectives and 
priorities, the means for providing a coherent narrative, and the 
foundation for better transparency and accountability. But to do so, 
the Framework has to be elevated and strengthened. Importantly, it has 
to be seen and presented as an exercise embracing the entire G20 
process and not confined to macroeconomic policy. Australia should 
establish a road-map for achieving these outcomes when it chairs the 
G20 in 2014. 
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To be effective, international economic forums 
need to have clear objectives and a coherent 
plan for achieving them. They also need to be 
able to explain the importance of these 
objectives and have robust processes to assess 
whether they are being achieved. The G20 falls 
short on all of these core elements. There was 
clarity of purpose when G20 leaders first met in 
November 2008 – the aim was to stop the 
world economy falling into a deeper recession 
and to lay the basis for future growth. But since 
then the sense of common resolve has waned. 
More attention is being directed at the 
differences between members rather than their 
shared goals. The G20’s agenda has expanded 
significantly and now includes many items that 
appear unrelated to each other or the forum’s 
key objectives and are not prioritised. Public 
communication has been poor, transparency is 
lacking, and accountability processes need to be 
more effective.  
 
If the G20 is truly to be the premier forum for 
international economic cooperation it must be 
clearer about its objectives and more 
transparent about its processes, and members 
need to be more accountable for their 
commitments. Fortunately the forum does not 
need to start from scratch. The Framework for 
Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth, 
agreed by leaders at the 2009 Pittsburgh 
Summit, provides an overarching mechanism 
that focuses and links the actions of G20 
members toward achieving their shared 
objectives, and provides a process through 
which members are held accountable for their 
performance. The Framework should form the 
core and backbone of the G20.    
 
 
 
The importance of shared objectives 
 
Clear objectives are necessary for any forum to 
be effective, but given the size and diversity of 
the G20’s membership, it is particularly 
important that members are clear about their 
goals and the benefits from collective action. 
Being a large and heterogeneous grouping, the 
focus has to be on what members have in 
common rather than the areas where they 
differ. 
 
The G20’s diversity is both a strength and a 
challenge. It is a strength because by including 
emerging market and developing countries, the 
G20 is more representative of the changes 
taking place in the global economy compared 
to forums such as the G7. In 1980, G7 
economies contributed 56 per cent of global 
GDP (on a PPP basis).
1
 In 2012 they 
contributed 38 per cent. The contribution to 
global GDP by emerging markets and 
developing economies rose from 31 per cent in 
1980 to 50 per cent in 2012.
2
 Since the global 
financial crisis in 2008, the emerging markets 
and developing economies have been the main 
driver of global growth. The health of the 
global economy will increasingly be linked to 
how well the developing world is doing. The 
US National Intelligence Council predicts that 
by 2030, the continuing strong growth of 
China and India will result in Asia surpassing 
North America and Europe combined in terms 
of global power based upon GDP, population 
size, military spending and technological 
investment.
3
  
 
There are now many more major players on the 
world stage, and they need to be 
accommodated in global economic decision-
making if that decision-making is to be effective 
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and relevant. The global economy is now too 
large, diverse and complex to be led by any one 
country or by a small group of like-minded 
countries, such as the G7. The rise of the G20 
reflects this changing international order. 
 
The breadth of the G20’s membership is, 
however, also a challenge. When the G7 was 
formed it represented the dominant powers of 
the day, but its members also shared the 
additional characteristics of being democratic, 
largely ‘Atlantic –oriented’ and militarily allied 
to the United States.
4
 By contrast, the G20 is 
not only a significantly larger forum, it is a mix 
of differing political systems, economic 
structures and conditions, and cultural 
backgrounds. In addition, every G20 leader 
does not have the same depth of relationships 
with other leaders compared with G7 leaders.   
 
The diversity of interests among G20 members 
is frequently cited as a reason why the forum is 
struggling to provide effective global economic 
leadership. Moisés Naím claims that as the 
number and interests of those sitting at the 
negotiating table have increased, the 
opportunities for consensus and concerted 
action have shrunk.
5
 He argues that ‘when all 
these disparate and often conflicting interests 
need to be incorporated into any agreement, 
the resulting solutions fall short of what is 
needed to solve the problem.’
6
 Jörg Asmussen, 
who before joining the Board of the European 
Central Bank was the G20 finance deputy for 
Germany, noted: 
 
‘the shift from the G7 to the G20 has 
increased representativeness of the leading 
forum for international cooperation at the 
cost of increasing diversity of values and 
interest expressed at the negotiating table. 
Differences in views on issues like the Doha 
trade talks or climate change are such that 
they are rarely tabled for discussion in G20 
meetings anymore, because chances for 
progress are thin.’7  
 
This diversity of membership should not 
preclude concerted action by G20 members on 
key global economic issues. Agreements may be 
harder to obtain, but international economic 
cooperation remains vital. 
 
Moreover, despite differences in their political, 
cultural, and economic structures, there is 
much G20 members have in common, 
particularly because their economies are closely 
integrated and interdependent. Improvements 
in the technology of transport and 
communications, the reduction in protectionist 
barriers, and the liberalisation of capital 
markets have all been driving forces behind this 
increasing interdependence. There has been 
strong growth in global trade in goods and 
services, but global capital flows have increased 
considerably faster. The result is not only closer 
integration, but potentially greater volatility, as 
demonstrated by the global financial crisis in 
2008 and its aftermath.   
 
When G20 leaders first met in Washington in 
November 2008, they demonstrated a common 
resolve to respond to the global financial crisis. 
Building on this shared commitment to restore 
growth, at the leaders’ summit in London in 
April 2009 they agreed on a $1.1 trillion 
package to increase the resources of the 
international financial institutions and a 
combined fiscal expansion of over $5 trillion. 
Since then, the varied pace of recovery across 
members has taken its toll on consensus 
building and economic cooperation. Yet while 
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the policy priorities facing members may vary 
depending on the strength of their recoveries, 
G20 economies are no less integrated than they 
were in 2008. The international financial 
spillovers arising from the effect of monetary 
policy easing in advanced economies is one 
clear manifestation of the interlinkages between 
economies; as was the impact of developments 
in the eurozone crisis on equity markets and 
confidence worldwide. The International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) observed in their 2012 
spillover report that the high correlation of 
asset price movements across countries 
suggested shared uncertainties over global 
economic prospects, sourced in particular from 
the impact of euro area stresses.
8
  
 
Of course, the mere existence of economic 
interlinkages and the interdependent nature of 
the global economy will not inevitably lead to 
closer cooperation. The importance of 
cooperation needs to be constantly reinforced. 
This is the key role of the G20, but it will 
require commitment and leadership. Given the 
diversity of G20 members, a particular effort 
needs to be directed towards identifying and 
emphasising shared objectives and priorities as 
well as the mutual gains from collective action. 
This will help the G20 take more focused and 
more concerted action to deal with global 
economic challenges, and help address concerns 
that the forum is being handicapped by a 
poorly focused agenda. Clearly articulated 
objectives and priorities will help ensure that 
any proposed addition to the agenda is assessed 
in terms of its relevance to the G20’s shared 
goals.   
 
 
 
 
The need for a clear narrative 
 
Communication has been another key 
weakness of the G20. It is not enough for the 
forum to have clear objectives. It must be able 
to explain them in a way that domestic 
constituencies can understand. As Asmussen 
points out, however, G20 decisions are often 
difficult to convey and explain at the domestic 
level, and the forum appears distant and 
irrelevant to many citizens of its member states. 
This undermines the legitimacy and 
effectiveness of the G20.
 9
  
 
The domestic politics of international economic 
cooperation will always be difficult. Leaders 
may commit to policies at international 
summits, but implementation will often involve 
tough and unpopular domestic decisions for 
what may appear to be unclear benefits. To win 
the domestic political battles, it is essential that 
the reasons for the policy action are clearly 
explained. It is rare to find a domestic 
constituency prepared to support economic 
pain at home for the sake of the overall health 
of the global economy, even if the latter 
ultimately benefits the home economy as well. 
The challenge for the G20 is summed up well 
by Thomas Mann: 
 
‘The widespread public scepticism of global 
governance combined with the inevitable 
opposition of interests within member 
countries to difficult G20 agreements puts 
the burden on the summiteers to think 
carefully about how best to package and 
market those agreements to their domestic 
publics. The difficulty lies in constructing 
narratives that are both true … simple, 
understandable, and appealing to domestic 
audiences.’10 
  
Page 6 
A n a l y s i s  
Strengthening the Core of the G20 
Improving transparency and strengthening 
accountability 
 
The G20 is a club where the only specified 
membership criterion is that a country is 
‘systemically important.’ What constitutes 
systemic importance has never been made clear. 
The legitimacy and representativeness of the 
G20 has often been criticised, especially by 
those countries that have been excluded. While 
the best way to answer these critics is for the 
forum to be effective in its goal of promoting 
global economic growth, the G20 could also 
enhance its legitimacy – including amongst a 
sometime sceptical public in member countries 
– by being more transparent about its 
operations and decision-making.   
 
Terra Lawson-Remer argues that the G20 is 
‘widely perceived by the public as transnational 
elites hatching plans behind closed doors in 
insulated centres of power.’
11
 G20 chairs 
engage in active outreach with non-members, 
but little clarity is offered about how the results 
of this outreach are shared with other G20 
members or fed into decision-making processes. 
Civil society representatives (C20) have also 
called for greater transparency and 
accountability within the G20, particularly in 
terms of the operation of the various working 
groups.
12
  
 
Closely related to complaints about the G20’s 
lack of transparency have been criticisms of the 
processes used to assess whether the 
commitments made by members are 
implemented. Transparency and accountability 
are the twin pillars of democratic governance, 
for the more transparent governments are, the 
greater the capacity for citizens to hold their 
governing institutions to account. Hence 
greater transparency regarding the processes 
and decision-making structure of the G20 will 
inevitably strengthen its accountability. 
 
The need for G20 members to be accountable 
for their commitments has repeatedly been 
acknowledged in leaders’ communiqués. The 
first summit in Washington in November 2008 
stated that strengthening transparency and 
accountability were among the common 
principles that needed to underline the 
implementation of policies. Leaders emphasised 
the importance of implementing commitments, 
and outlined targets and timetables for 
financial regulatory reform. At the London 
summit, leaders emphasised the importance of 
translating their words into action and agreed 
that they would review progress towards 
meeting their commitments at their next 
meeting. At the Pittsburgh summit in 
September 2009, a progress report by members 
on the status of actions agreed at the previous 
summits was released. Similar reports were 
released at subsequent summits. 
 
Notwithstanding these progress reports, the 
G20 has been criticised for failing to produce a 
rigorous accountability mechanism, including a 
baseline set of standards, accurate and 
consistent shared information, and an agreed 
set of consequences for non-compliance.
13
  
 
At the Los Cabos summit in June 2012, leaders 
agreed on an Accountability Assessment 
Framework to accompany the Growth and Jobs 
Action Plan.
14
 The guiding principles outlined 
for the accountability assessments were that 
they would be country-owned and country-led, 
based on each member’s assessment of their 
performance in meeting policy commitments, 
with the input of independent third-party 
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evaluations (by the IMF and other international 
organisations). There was also reference to a 
‘peer-review process informed by third-party 
assessments.’ The accountability assessment 
report released as part of the Los Cabos 
Summit was prepared by members. The peer-
review process within the G20 is, however, still 
a work in progress. 
 
 
The response: The Framework for Strong, 
Sustainable and Balanced Growth  
 
The Framework for Strong, Sustainable and 
Balanced Growth provides the basis for 
clarifying the objectives and priorities of the 
G20, pulling the forum’s work into a coherent 
story, and improving transparency and 
accountability. It should be the backbone of the 
G20’s processes and agenda, but to achieve 
such an outcome, the operation of the 
Framework has to be improved. Importantly, it 
has to be broadened from being a technocratic 
exercise focused largely on macroeconomic 
policy to a process that embraces the entire 
G20 agenda. 
 
The Framework is a ‘compact’ where G20 
members agree on shared policy objectives, set 
out medium-term policy measures, and review 
progress in meeting these objectives and the 
need for additional policy action based on a 
Mutual Assessment Process (MAP). It is an 
ambitious and potentially historic exercise. It 
recognises that while each G20 member bears 
primary responsibility for the sound 
management of their own economy, they also 
have a responsibility ‘to the community of 
nations to assure the overall health of the 
global economy.’
15
  
 
The strength of the Framework is that it is a 
country-led exercise based on mutual 
assessments as to whether the policy measures 
taken by G20 members are consistent with the 
forum’s shared objectives. This approach 
differs in important ways from IMF 
surveillance. The IMF provides policy advice 
which is either accepted or ignored by 
individual countries. A constant challenge 
facing the IMF is to get ‘policy traction’ with its 
surveillance of large advanced countries. An 
earlier attempt at macroeconomic policy 
coordination overseen by the IMF was not 
successful. The multilateral consultations 
launched by the IMF in 2006 involved the 
United States, the Euro area, China, Japan and 
Saudi Arabia. The objective was to outline the 
policy measures that should be undertaken by 
each of the countries in order to reduce global 
current account imbalances. The plans were 
presented by the IMF, but countries were not 
willing to commit and the consultations were a 
failure. A key reason they failed was because 
the process was driven by the IMF and there 
was limited political ownership by the countries 
involved. In the case of the Framework and the 
MAP, however, the IMF only provides 
technical assistance as required. The exercise is 
led by the member states themselves. 
   
Prior to its launch at the Pittsburgh Summit in 
2009, there was little elaboration of how the 
Framework would operate. Immediately 
following its launch, there were debates as to 
what ‘strong, sustainable and balanced’ growth 
involved and whether each component had an 
equal weight. To perform their assigned task 
and assess whether members’ policies were 
consistent in meeting this objective, the IMF 
interpreted strong as ‘above potential,’ 
sustainable as ‘increasingly led by the private 
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sector’ and balanced as ‘broad-based across 
G20 members.’
16
  
 
Work on the Framework and MAP has been 
advanced by a G20 working group of officials 
chaired by Canada and India. The exercise 
involves countries sharing policy plans and 
forecasts and projections in advance of the 
leaders and ministerial meetings. These are then 
aggregated by the IMF, which advises whether 
the policies are consistent with the growth 
objectives. The IMF also provides advice on an 
‘upside scenario’ based on additional 
collaborative policy actions. The outcome of 
this work is fed into the growth and jobs action 
plans released at the various summits. Progress 
reports on the implementation of commitments 
are also released and at the Los Cabos summit 
leaders agreed on a more robust Accountability 
Framework. 
 
 
Improving the operation of the Framework 
 
When the Framework was first launched, 
leaders said that as part of the mutual 
assessment process, G20 members would agree 
on shared policy objectives and that these 
objectives would be updated as conditions 
evolved. The Framework’s overarching 
objective of achieving ‘strong, sustainable and 
balanced’ growth was never defined, but has 
been repeated to the point where it is now seen 
as jargon and has lost its impact. With the 
wisdom of hindsight, it would have been 
preferable if, at the time the Framework was 
launched, more attention had been paid to 
what was envisaged by this phrase. It is 
particularly concerning that there is a growing 
tendency to give a narrow interpretation of 
‘strong, sustainable and balanced’ growth and 
to view it as focusing solely on the issue of 
external imbalances (current account 
imbalances). Balanced growth should also be 
seen as more than broad-based growth across 
members, as currently interpreted by the IMF. 
It should involve narrowing the development 
gap between all countries as well as improving 
income equality within countries. 
 
In terms of specifying a clearer objective for the 
G20, Russia has said that as chair in 2013 it 
will prioritise achieving growth and creating 
jobs. This is a goal that is more readily 
understood by the public. However, achieving 
growth and creating jobs are high-order 
objectives. For each year’s summit, more 
specific shared objectives need to be identified. 
The speech by President Vladimir Putin to G20 
finance ministers and central bank governors 
on 16 February 2013 made a start when he 
stated Russia’s priorities would be to 
’encourage investment, increase transparency, 
and make regulation more effective.’
17
 The 
Russian approach is welcome. However, it 
should be extended and, rather than the current 
approach of the rotating chair outlining their 
own priorities for the G20, the focus should be 
on identifying the common priorities of 
members.  
 
The Framework envisages that the objectives of 
the G20 be updated as conditions evolve. This 
should be put into practice in a more rigorous 
fashion. At the start of each year, G20 
members should agree on specific priorities in 
terms of achieving economic and jobs growth. 
This would help reinforce the sense that 
members have common and agreed objectives. 
In doing so, G20 members should emphasise 
that their economies are interconnected and 
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that greater gains can come from collective 
action.  
 
 
Extending the Framework to the entire 
G20 agenda 
 
The Framework should be seen as applying to 
everything on the G20 agenda and not just 
macroeconomic issues. The current tendency is 
for the agenda items to be considered as self-
contained issues that are largely advanced 
though separate working groups and processes. 
This contributes to the sense that the agenda is 
too long and disparate. Having the Framework 
form the overarching mechanism for 
considering the G20’s activities would lead to a 
greater focus on assessing how the items are 
collectively contributing to achieving the G20’s 
objectives. Currently, the G20’s discussion of 
the Framework is confined to an agenda item 
dealing with the global economy, with the 
work and preparation of the summit action 
plans undertaken by the Framework Working 
Group.  
 
President Putin noted in his speech to G20 
finance ministers in February 2013 that ‘ … all 
the issues on the agenda we have proposed are 
closely interlinked and complement each other. 
For example, creating a good environment for 
investment growth automatically includes 
adjusting financial instruments, carrying out 
structural reform and fighting corruption.’
18
 
Similar points can be made about the way that 
trade liberalisation helps to generate jobs 
globally or how the advancement of developing 
economies provides an important source of 
global growth and helps reduce development 
gaps between countries.  
 
The complementarities between all agenda 
items need to be highlighted, but it is also 
essential that the G20 agenda be appropriately 
focused and prioritised. To the extent that the 
work of the G20 is approached as a 
comprehensive package under the umbrella of 
the Framework, this could have the added 
benefit of imposing discipline on the agenda. 
All new items would have to pass tests of how 
they fit into the overall narrative, and how they 
are contributing to achieving the G20’s shared 
objectives. 
 
Demonstrating the linkages between the items 
on the G20 agenda will assist in explaining to 
the public in a more coherent fashion what 
G20 members are seeking to achieve and why. 
As Alan Beattie notes: 
 
‘It is much easier for a reporter to tell her or 
his news desk in a single sentence that the 
G20 has achieved one particular goal than it 
is to have to explain what incremental 
changes have been made in discussions on 
macroeconomic assessments, fiscal policy, 
financial regulation, the Basel accords and 
capital requirements, bank taxes, 
governance of the International monetary 
fund, and a raft of other equally arcane 
topics.’ 19 
 
But even if the Framework is used to tie 
together the G20 agenda into a cohesive 
narrative it will still require a more concerted 
effort by politicians and officials in all countries 
to explain more coherently what the G20 is 
trying to achieve and why.  
 
As part of ensuring that the Framework forms 
the core of the G20 and provides the basis for 
demonstrating that the objectives and policy 
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measures of members are consistent, it will be 
essential to reverse the current tendency for it 
to be seen as a technical exercise. One step 
towards this is to no longer have a Framework 
Working Group in the G20. The Framework, 
and the task of achieving economic growth and 
creating jobs, should embrace all working 
groups as well as the activities of sherpas, 
ministers and leaders. The current Framework 
Working Group could be renamed the 
Economic Policy Working Group. 
 
 
Strengthening G20 accountability and 
transparency 
 
Greater clarity about the shared priorities of 
G20 members at the start of each year will 
assist in improving the forum’s accountability 
in terms of assessing whether specific objectives 
have been achieved. But greater transparency as 
to how G20 members are assessing progress in 
meeting their commitments will also help 
strengthen the accountability process. 
Currently, work on the new Accountability 
Framework is being advanced through the 
Framework Working Group and an 
accountability report is expected to be released 
at the St Petersburg summit. More accessible 
public information about the development and 
operation of the Accountability Framework 
will remove the impression that it is a ‘black 
box’ exercise. This would allow those outside 
government – such as academics, think tanks, 
civil society groups – to comment on the 
appropriateness of the assessments and the 
veracity of the accountability reports. 
Currently, public information on the MAP is 
very limited, with the main source being 
material released by the IMF. Greater 
transparency will help to strengthen 
accountability. 
 
In terms of independent G20 accountability 
assessments, the G20 Research Group at the 
University of Toronto and the National 
Research University Higher School of 
Economics in Moscow jointly prepare a report 
attempting to gauge whether G20 members 
keep their promises. These reports analyse a 
selection of the many commitments made in 
summit declarations and related material. The 
methodology uses a scale ranging from -1 to 
+1, where +1 indicates full compliance with the 
stated commitment, -1 indicates failure to 
comply and 0 indicates partial compliance or 
work in progress. The scores are aggregated to 
provide an overall assessment of G20 progress 
in implementing commitments. The report 
explicitly states that it ‘is focused on the 
implementation of decisions and does not 
attempt to estimate the impact or effectiveness 
of the G20 actions.’
20
 
 
There are a number of issues raised by this 
assessment methodology. For example, the 
scorecard approach does not provide any 
indication of compliance when there is not full 
implementation and there is work in progress. 
In addition, the arbitrary and judgemental 
assessments blunt the impact of the reports, 
although they may be beneficial in starting a 
conversation over the implementation of G20 
commitments. The value of focusing solely on 
progress by G20 members in implementing 
detailed commitments and not assessing 
whether broader objectives are being achieved 
is also questionable. For example, it is one 
thing to concentrate on compliance with the 
timetable for the introduction of new bank 
capital standards, but the most important 
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assessments should be progress in establishing a 
stable and efficient financial system that 
facilitates economic growth.   
 
The Centre for International Governance 
Innovation (CIGI) has advocated that the G20 
should introduce a more robust and 
transparent peer-review mechanism similar to 
the OECD process.
21
 They suggest annual 
accountability reports in which a random three-
country reviewer group be established for each 
member. To enhance the analytical resources of 
the G20, CIGI has also proposed establishing 
an Economic Research Hub that would 
‘coordinate research across different 
institutions, organize conferences, identify 
projects for further research, work to give voice 
to previously marginalized viewpoints and 
dispense G20-funded grants aimed at key 
theoretical and analytical issues.’ 
22
  
 
The G20 does not have the resource base to 
fully replicate the OECD peer-review process, 
where the report on countries’ economic 
performance, which is the basis of the peer 
review, is prepared by the OECD secretariat. 
The idea of the G20 establishing its own 
‘research hub’ to undertake such a task would 
duplicate the work of other international 
organisations. It would also be tantamount to 
establishing a G20 secretariat which could see a 
reduction in capital-based involvement in the 
exercise.  
 
The ‘member-led’ nature of the Accountability 
Framework is fundamental to its effectiveness. 
But there are challenges in introducing a peer-
review process in the G20. The Bank of Canada 
considers that the current peer review does not 
work well because the G20 is so heterogeneous 
that it makes mutual assessment difficult.
23
 
However, the difficulty in establishing a robust 
mutual assessment process is not because of the 
differences in the views and priorities of the 
members, but because there is still concern over 
the even-handedness of any new process. It will 
take time to build confidence in peer review. 
The premature introduction of a ‘finger 
pointing’ exercise into the G20 would be 
divisive and detract from efforts towards 
greater cooperation.  
 
The challenge is to make G20 members feel 
accountable for their commitments. They will 
do so if they take the forum seriously, and there 
is likely to be domestic political backlash from 
any failure to implement their commitments, 
and more importantly, achieve results. Better 
public communication is an important part of 
this process. The G20 should focus more on 
promoting ‘mutual accountability,’ where 
members feel individually and collectively 
responsible for implementing their 
commitments, rather than ‘mutual assessment,’ 
with exposure and peer pressure seen as the 
main tools to encourage compliance. 
 
To strengthen accountability, including through 
increasing transparency and the involvement of 
the public, the G20 chair should hold a major 
accountability conference a few months before 
the annual G20 leaders’ summit. The focus of 
the public event would be on progress in 
implementing commitments made and 
achieving objectives set in previous summits. A 
significant amount of preparation would be 
required. Preceding the conference, the IMF, 
OECD, World Bank and Financial Stability 
Board should publish reports tracking G20 
members’ compliance with commitments and 
progress in achieving objectives. This should be 
followed by all G20 members preparing, and 
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publishing, succinct reports on how they assess 
progress in meeting their commitments. Civil 
society groups, business representatives, think 
tanks and academics should then be invited to 
comment on the accountability of G20 
members, drawing on the reports produced by 
the international organisations and the 
associated country responses. This topic could 
be advanced through meetings of business 
representatives (B20), civil society (C20) and 
think tanks (T20) in advance of the conference. 
All these reports would be public and would 
provide the background material for the 
conference. The G20 chair should be seeking 
very senior representation from G20 members, 
such as sherpas and preferably some ministers. 
Speakers would be drawn from officials, 
academics, business, civil society, think tanks, 
and the press. The results of this annual G20 
accountability conference would be fed into the 
leaders’ summit, for such a conference would 
inevitably cover what more needs to be done 
for the G20 to meet its commitments. 
 
 
What Australia should do in 2014 – a 
road-map 
 
One of Australia’s aims when it chairs the G20 
in 2014 should be to strengthen the forum and 
make it more effective. Towards this end, 
Australia should place the Framework at the 
centre of the G20 and use it as the basis to 
strengthen the shared objectives, narrative, 
transparency and accountability of the G20.  
 
Drawing on the points made in this paper and 
the proposals outlined in Relaunching the 
G20,
24
 Australia should introduce the 
following approach to chairing the forum in 
2014: 
 Propose to G20 members that achieving 
sustainable economic and jobs growth, 
along with reducing inequity, must remain 
the overarching objective of the G20. 
 Establish that the Framework for Strong, 
Sustainable and Balanced Growth is the 
core of the G20 and all items on the G20 
agenda should be prioritised in terms of 
their contribution to achieving economic 
and jobs growth. To reinforce that the 
implementation of the Framework is the 
responsibility of the entire G20 process and 
is not assigned to a single working group, 
the ‘Framework Working Group’ would be 
renamed the ‘Economic Policy Working 
Group.’  
 Emphasise the agreed specific shared 
priorities of all members for the G20 in 
2014 rather than focus on what are 
Australia’s priorities as chair. Agreement on 
shared priorities should be reached at the 
first sherpa meeting under the Australian 
chair and thereafter the reference should 
always be to the ‘G20’s priorities’ and not 
‘Australia’s priorities.’  
 Articulate and publicise the linkages 
between agenda items to be advanced by the 
G20 in 2014 in a manner that can be 
understood by the public. 
 Request accountability reports from 
international organisations, responses from 
G20 members, and an assessment by think 
tanks, academics, civil society, and business 
for consideration at a high-level 
accountability conference in 2014.  
 Release all the accountability reports to the 
public in advance of the conference and 
report the results from the conference to 
leaders at their summit in November 2014. 
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Conclusion 
 
There is a pressing need to improve core 
elements of the G20’s operations: clarity over 
the shared objectives of members; the quality of 
communications with the public; transparency 
of its operations; and the rigour of assessments 
as to whether members are meeting their 
commitments. All of these elements reinforce 
each other. If members are clear as to the G20’s 
priorities, and how agenda items are 
contributing to achieving shared objectives, 
then there is the greater prospect of clearer and 
more coherent messaging. Greater clarity over 
objectives will also facilitate better assessments 
of performance. And the more transparent the 
process of assessing members’ compliance with 
commitments, the more likely members will 
take their commitments seriously. 
 
The challenge for Australia when it chairs the 
G20 in 2014 is to make the forum more 
effective. This will depend in on how it 
prepares for the meetings, how it sets agendas, 
and the processes and procedures that it 
introduces. In all these areas Australia should 
be aiming to strengthen the core elements of the 
forum – shared objectives, communication, 
transparency, and accountability. In doing so, 
Australia should set a standard that future G20 
chairs will want to follow. This would 
represent an ongoing contribution to improving 
the G20. 
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